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This thesis focuses on the B2B-Service market. Two independent essays are 
included to examine two important issues that influence the profitability in these 
markets.  
The first essay studies the contracting decision in B2B-Service market. In these 
markets, contract is the major form of transactions and also a key scheme to retain the 
relationship between business partners. Specifically, we study the decisions on 
contract length and its mutual influences with the business relationship. We develop a 
theoretical model that captures the critical factors involved in this contracting process, 
and derive the optimal contract length and relationship length. The main factors 
include the market dynamics and uncertainty, contracting cost and the cost to form 
new relationships. Then, using the empirical evidence obtained from the offshore 
drilling industry, where drilling rigs are rented by the oil companies from the rig 
owners, we demonstrate the usefulness of our model. The insights are also applicable 
to service industries such as real estate, outsourcing, etc. 
The second essay examines how the B2B-service providers forecast the future 
demand thus to effectively utilize the expensive assets involved in the services. When 
companies such as HP and Dell enter new geographical markets their business growth 
could be analyzed using the demand growth models one can find in the marketing 
literature, e.g. Bass (1969). However, if we move a step upstream in the supply chain 
 vi
and look at the industries that serve these businesses, surprisingly not much 
information is available on how these industries behave in a new market with respect 
to meeting demand from their business clients. Specifically, consider the 3PL industry 
(i.e.Third-party Logistics such as UPS and CatLogistics) that provides comprehensive 
logistics services to the businesses in a new region. Or, consider the rig companies 
such as Noble who provide oil-well drilling services for the oil companies like Shell 
and BP. What type of demand growth do these B2B-Serivces companies face for their 
services in a new market? How do these service providers meet the demand? This is 
important to analyze because these B2B-Services companies invest huge sums of 
money in acquiring very expensive assets in order to serve their clients (e.g. UPS 
invests in huge ware-houses, Noble invests in multi-million dollar rigs), and hence 
they are very likely to do some careful planning before they make available their 
assets for hire in the new market area. However, returns from these assets depend not 
just on the availability of these assets in the market but also on the frequency with 
which the clients actually hire them. It is not clear how exactly these two processes, 
namely the asset-availability (i.e. supply) and utilization patterns, would evolve in a 
new market. In this essay, we focus on the drilling rig industry, and develop a model 
to track these two patterns, namely, how rigs are made available by the rig companies 
in a new oil field and how they are utilized by the oil companies. We test our models 
with three sets of data collected from this industry, and draw meaningful results.  
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There are many companies that are engaged in providing different kinds of 
services to their business clients. For example, 3PL service companies (i.e. 
Third-party Logistics) such as UPS and CAT Logistics provide comprehensive 
logistics services to big clients like HP and Dell. Shipping companies such as 
Mitsui OSK and NedLloyd provide transport services to many industries that ship 
goods across the globe. Drilling rig companies such as Noble and Transocean 
provide oil-well drilling services to oil firms such as BP and Shell. There are 
many companies in construction industry that service the construction contractors 
like Tamasek through renting out earth moving machineries. We call all such 
companies as Business-to-Business (a.k.a. B2B) Service companies.  
Many of these B2B-Service companies have to invest heavily in capital 
assets in order to provide their services. For example, the 3PL companies have 
their own warehouses built in various parts of the world, set-up exhaustive 
delivery infrastructure (including planes) and installed various high-tech tracking 
systems. Similarly, shipping companies invest in buying in big ships and 
oil-tankers, while the companies that serve the construction industry invest in 
huge cranes and other earth moving machineries. In the oil and gas industry, the 
drilling rig companies invest heavily in acquiring drilling rigs. These service 
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companies primarily hire out their capital assets to their business clients as part of 
their services, and hence their business success depends largely on how effectively 
they utilize (i.e. hire out) their assets over their life span. 
A direct factor influencing the utilization is whether the service companies 
can sign an effective hiring contract, or a series of contracts, for their assets. Most 
of the sales transactions of these B2B services are executed through negotiated 
contractual agreements. To reach such agreement is not an easy task in these 
markets. For example, a service contract signed between drilling rig companies 
and oil firms can easily have 400 pages and take months for negotiation. Besides 
the complex technical contents and lawsuit issues, the contracting parties have to 
decide on some critical aspects regarding the transaction itself, such as price and 
contract length (duration). As we observed from the market, the price for renting 
the equipment is largely influenced by the utilization pattern in the market. For 
example in oil drilling industry, the average day-rate (i.e. renting price) of drilling 
rigs is driven by the market utilization rate of rigs in the previous quarter or two. 
This average day-rate is a common knowledge to both sides of the contracting 
parties and is regarded as given. Remember that the value involved for each 
contract is really high, e.g. a contract for renting a rig typically values over 
millions of dollars. Hence the frequent fluctuations of prevailing market price 
result in an uncertain and difficult decision of contract durations for the 
contracting parties. Such uncertainties puzzled both parties in their operations. A 
wrong or less optimal decision on contract duration can return less revenue for the 
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service companies (or incur higher cost for the business clients) and even 
influence the business relationships between the two contracting parties. We will 
analyze this issue in details in the first essay of the thesis.  
Another factor that affects the utilization of assets is whether the service 
companies can foresee the future demand effectively. The service companies 
invest huge capitals on acquiring the assets and typically, they have to wait for a 
certain period before they have the assets delivered. It takes months or years to 
build up warehouses, planes, oil-tankers, or drilling rigs. Should the service 
companies order new assets in hot market? What will happen to the market before 
the assets delivered to the service companies? The questions are more difficult for 
the service companies to answer when their business clients are entering a new 
market and facing an uncertain demand themselves. For example, when HP or 
Dell enters a developing country such as China and India, how do the 3PL 
providers decide on the assets to invest in these markets? Or when oil firms begin 
to explore a new oil tract that nobody can estimate the reserve for sure, how many 
rigs that the rig companies order to meet the demand? Marketing literature did not 
provide a clear answer for these questions. We develop a descriptive model which 
seeks to put a structure to the industry dynamic behavior of service providers in 
terms of their supply decision to meet growing demand in a new market with 
uncertain capacity. A critical factor of this supply side behavior is the realized 
demand up to the previous period which affects the supply process in more than 
 4
one way, and we capture this in the model. We will explore the details in the 
second essay of the thesis.  
Who would be interested in the research of B2B-Services? Clearly, as a 
marketing discipline, since we currently have very little information in the 
B2B-Services sector a careful analysis will throw light on this industry and 
enhance our knowledge. Secondly, rig builders such as Keppel and Sembcorp, and 
companies such as Siemens who supply engineering material handling equipments 
including conveyor-belts and warehouse racks would be interested to know how 
their customers place orders when they enter a new market. Stock analysts who 
focus on the B2B-Services sector are another group of people who would be 
interested in our analysis.  
The thesis is organized as follows. Two independent essays are addressing 
the two issues discussed above. In each essay, the relevant industry information is 
introduced first, followed by a survey of literature. Then we will derive the 
theoretical models and discuss their implications. We have different data sets for 
testifying the models empirically. At the end of each essay, we will summarize the 
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I.  Introduction 
B2B services are becoming more important nowadays as companies are 
increasingly outsourcing their non-core activities to create a competitive edge. 
Comparing to the past, the B2B services are more complex and are involving the 
usage of advanced service products, especially for capital-intensive industries, e.g. 
petroleum, energy, 3PL (i.e. 3rd Party Logistics), etc. These industries require for 
advanced production machinery/equipment, complex control systems, and 
specialized knowledge of operation. Such services are normally executed on a 
contract basis, which is a major decision for both the service providers and the 
business clients.  
Let us consider the oil & gas industry. This is truly a global industry. Oil 
companies, many of which are based in the US, operate in oil fields around the 
world including Gulf of Mexico, Persian Gulf, West Africa, South America, North 
Sea and Russia. They operate on land (e.g. US and the Gulf countries) and 
off-shore (Gulf of Mexico, North Sea and West Africa). The operation primarily 
consists of drilling multiple wells in an oil field using drilling rigs. Once the wells 
are drilled, the rigs are moved out and the oil production starts from those wells. 
The oil that comes out is sent to refineries which convert the crude oil into various 
products including gasoline and compounds that are used for making plastic, soap 
and other consumer and industrial goods. Companies also drill for natural gas 
which is mainly used in industries and for heating homes in winter months, 
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especially in the US and Europe. Thus, oil well drilling is a very important 
component of this industry. 
 Although oil companies operate on a large scale that runs easily into billion 
of US dollars per year (i.e. in exploration and current operations), they never own 
the rigs that they use for drilling the wells. They always hire them from the rig 
companies. One reason is the apparent nonlinear relationship one could see 
between the oil demand they face and the number of wells they need to drill in the 
oil fields to meet that demand. Another reason, more important perhaps, is the 
heavily fluctuating demand (i.e. from the downstream market) and overall global 
supply condition largely determined by the OPEC countries1. As a result, the 
hiring of rigs has become a big business by itself in this industry.  
Rigs are owned and operated by drilling companies such as Noble, Premium 
Drilling, and Global Santa Fe. The rigs are manufactured by firms such as Keppel 
in Singapore. It costs around US$200 million to manufacture a rig that operates on 
off-shore oil fields, while it costs around US$100 million to manufacture rigs that 
are used in land. The rigs typically lasts for 25 years, but could be made obsolete 
even before that time when technically superior rigs comes in to the market. 
Hence, the drilling companies that own these rigs have to think carefully before 
they hire them out to oil companies. The typical hiring rate (i.e. the “day-rate”, as 
                                                 
1 Since OPEC controls roughly 1/3 of the world market supply, its decision on 
how much to supply in a given period of time affects the crude inventory and the 
oil price, which in turn affect the oil well drilling activities. 
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it is called in this industry), ranges from US $20,000 per day to US$180,000 per 
day, while the length of the contract varies from a few months to a few years 
period. The length of a contract and the associated day-rate vary across contracts 
depending on the type of rig that is hired (age, technical capabilities), the area 
where the drilling is expected to take place, the oil company hiring it, the expected 
demand fluctuation in the market, and the drilling company that owns the rig. 
Two key elements exist in a contract, namely, day-rate and length of the 
contract, which jointly decide the value of the contract. Will the contracting 
parties optimize their contract decisions on both of the two elements? Or, will they 
take one of them as given and try to decide on the other? What we observe in the 
industry is that day-rate would be largely a function of the prevailing day-rate in 
the market, which in turn is driven by the recent utilization rates. Figure1.1 shows 
the day-rates (in terms of mean and standard deviation, respectively) of contracts 
for jack-up rigs in GOM area signed in each month from January 2000 to July 
2006.  
Figure1.1 shows a clear pattern of rising day-rate in these six years, a hot 
period of drilling activities, while the standard deviation of day-rate does not 
change as drastically as the mean. In fact, the standard deviation remains in a 
relatively stable level across the six years. This observation is consistent with 
what we learnt from the industry. The prevailing market day-rate is a knowledge 
that both the contracting parties understand and follow when they are signing the 
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contract. Often though the day-rate varies, perhaps a bit up or down based on 
recent trends, it is because they add an accessory or two at additional costs as no 
rig matches a drilling program perfectly. 
Figure 1.1 Day-Rates Plot 
 
In contrast, is the decision of contract length following the same pattern? 
Figure 1.2 below shows the contract lengths of the contracts mentioned above. It 
is not clear how the contract length is changing with the rising day-rate in the past 
several years. Moreover, the lengths of contracts signed within each month can be 
highly different from each other. We confirmed our observation with the industry 
that a lot negotiation of contract actually happened on contract length, which 
varies by region, company policy, and many others.  
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Figure 1.2 Contract Length Plot 
 
In fact, this problem is quite similar to the one of signing a house rental 
contract. When a tenant and a house owner negotiate on a contract, they will take 
into consideration the recent rental price in market. With this information and 
their renting needs (e.g. the tenant may need to stay in the place for 2 years or the 
house owner has plan to sell the house out within 3 years), they will decide on 
their preferred contract lengths and negotiate to see whether their terms can match. 
Normally the rental will just follow the market average level with modifications 
based on the specific conditions of the house, e.g. location, furniture, warranty, etc. 
It is unlikely that they negotiate on the rental and the contract length jointly. For 
example, if a house owner is asking for US$1,000/month to lease an apartment for 
one year and the rental is regarded reasonable comparing to the market average 
level, s/he will most probably stick to this rental level. Even if a tenant wants to 
rent the apartment for longer term, it’s unlikely to reduce the rental much.  
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Average Contract Length Standard Deviation of Length 
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Therefore we will focus on how an appropriate length is decided for a 
contract. A longer contract would ensure the rig companies that their rigs will be 
on job for a long time, and ensure the oil companies as well that they have rigs to 
drill new oil wells. An idle rig not only deprives the rig firm of potential revenue 
but also forces the firm to incur additional costs such as rig maintenance costs2 
and loan servicing costs. In this sense, it is like sending a plane on a flight with 
some empty seats. Equivalently, from the perspective of the oil company, if it 
loses a rig it will be difficult and expensive3 to get another rig for hire, especially 
in a tight market. A long-term contract would obviate these problems. However, 
in contrast, because the oil industry experiences widely varying demand-for-rigs 
and day-rates, signing repeatedly many short-term contracts would enable the 
firms to quickly catch up with the market rates. In other words, in absence of any 
information about the future trends, both the oil companies and rig companies 
would love to have short contracts that would be able to reflect the market 
conditions closely. For this purpose, signing short-term contracts seem logical. 
However, it takes a long time to negotiate and write-up a contract. A typical 
contract in this industry takes a month to negotiate and the actual agreement could 
                                                 
2 Maintenance of an idle rig is very expensive. It is in the order of US$30,000 per 
day.  
3 For example, if a rig has to be moved from a different place, the oil company 
would incur moving costs to a tune of US $1 million. Further, it stands to lose 
time and the associated revenue it could make on the oil that could be produced in 
that time period.  
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run up to 400 pages, and hence the actual cost4 of entering a new contract can be 
very expensive. Thus, the decision on choosing an appropriate contract length is 
not straight-forward. 
Why is this topic of contract length interesting to explore? First, while there 
have been general directional suggestions on what factors affect the contract 
length, there has been no systematic study in the marketing literature that brings 
them together in a comprehensive framework. Secondly, a researcher could 
suggest an ad-hoc model that accommodates all these factors say like in a linear 
regression, and using the actual data s/he could empirically estimate the impact of 
those factors. However, such an ad-hoc model will not reveal the true impact of 
these factors on the contract length determination, nor would it reveal 
convincingly any inter-relationship among those factors that might affect the 
contract length. Further, if one were to use the results s/he obtains from ad-hoc 
model to derive normative policies, s/he might get misleading results. Third, to 
our knowledge, there has been no model forwarded in the marketing literature that 
addresses specifically the contract issues facing the B2B-Serivces sector.  
Hence there is a strong need for proposing a theoretically sound model on the 
determination of contract length in the B2B-Services market. Our main objective 
in this research is to build a theoretical model that takes into account all the key 
                                                 
4 As we learnt from the industry, the cost is up to $250,000 excluding any 
changes required to the rig or relocating the rig. However, we don’t have specific 
information on this cost in our data. Hence we will use certain proxy to estimate 
the cost in the model.  
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factors and seeks an optimal contract length that would be a function of all the 
factors. Following the development of the model, we use the real data from the oil 
rig industry and empirically validate the model, and further evaluate to what 
degree these factors affect the contract length.  
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. In Section II, we discuss the 
relevant research found in the literature and show how clearly the extant literature 
has not put forward a theoretical model in this area. In Section III, we develop our 
model and discuss its various characteristics to show how it addresses the impact 
of the various factors and the inter-relationship among them. In Section IV, we 
provide an empirical test for the model and discuss the results. In Section V, we 
conclude the paper giving directions for future research in this area.  
II. Literature 
There are several papers in economics discussing the oil drilling industry. 
Porter (1995) described the information of oil and gas industry in general and 
analyzed several decisions including the oil firms’ bidding behaviors for oil tracts. 
Hendricks and Porter (1996) studied the timing decisions of exploratory drilling 
activities. However, their research mainly concerned the leasing patterns between 
oil companies and government, rather than the transactions between oil companies 
and drilling firms. A more relevant research is by Corts and Singh (2004) who 
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discussed the choice of contract format between day-rate contract and turnkey5 
contract for drilling services. They found that if the two parties are more familiar 
with each other by previous work, they will prefer to use day-rate contract, a 
somewhat surprising result. In our examination of the oil industry, we find that the 
turnkey contracts account for only a small fraction6 of contracts in the market. 
Hence we will focus on the day-rate contract only and examine its characteristics. 
The issue of contract length has been discussed in economics and 
management literature. One of the major research streams is the labor economics, 
e.g. Gray (1978) and Ball (1987), which concentrates on the length of labor 
contracts. These theoretical works suggest that transaction costs are positively 
influencing the contract length while uncertainties are negatively affecting it. The 
uncertainties they considered are the disturbances in money supply and production 
function. Rich and Tracy (2004) used labor contract data to empirically validate 
these theoretical models and confirmed the conclusions that inflation uncertainty 
leads to shorter contract.  
Another area of research discussing contract length is operations research. 
For example, Chao and Wilson (1990) studied the contract length for priority 
service (i.e. advance order for scarce supplies). They consider the serial 
                                                 
5 Turnkey contract here means the oil company will pay the rig firm a fixed price 
for drilling a well.  
6 Less than 10%.  
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correlation in the evaluation of consumers which determines the sales amount and 
examine its influence on optimal contract length.  
Despite the rich research on contract lengths in general in the B2C area, little 
work has been done on the contract decisions taken between business firms. B2B 
markets make the contract length determination more challenging to analyze. First, 
firms are more serious in the relationship with their contracting partner since there 
are a smaller number of customers in B2B markets and losing even one of them 
may have a serious impact on the firm’s overall business. So, firms in the B2B 
contract setting tend to think beyond the current contract. This is not the case in 
the B2C market contracts. Hence understanding how contract decisions help to 
maintain such business relationship and how the relationship impacts on the 
contract length determination are new to the research literature on contracts. 
Second, both the contracting parties in B2B markets are powerful enough to 
influence the final contract terms. This is different from B2C markets where 
business firms are facing a large amount of customers that an individual consumer 
cannot influence the contract decision. Third, some B2B markets, such as the oil 
drilling industry, offer us the chance to study the problem empirically. Although 
there are some empirical works (e.g. Seaton (2003) which studies the contract 
length in franchising), they mainly look for some influencing factors by running 
regression models rather than establishing models on a theoretical basis. 
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III. Model 
There are primarily two ways to model the contracting behavior. One way is 
to look at each party in the contract, understand the objective function of each and 
try to find the common ground that is appealing to both the parties using game 
theoretic concepts such as Nash equilibrium. The second way is to observe as a 
researcher the contracts and their various determining factors, build a model that 
explains the structure of the process, and empirically test the validity of the model. 
In the first approach, the focus is on the players while in the second approach the 
focus is on the contracts per se. We take the second approach in this research 
paper.  
As mentioned in the introduction, the contracting parties, namely, the oil 
companies and the rig firms, would like to have longer contracts to save on the 
contracting costs but would be worried the same if they see the market dynamics 
rapidly make the contracting terms out of tune with the market trends. We now 
focus on modeling the two factors in detail.  
Factor 1 (Contracting Cost): This is the cost that is involved in actually 
discussing the terms of the contract, doing research to find out the prevailing 
market trends, and carrying out the necessary administration and paper work. 
Let’s assume this contracting cost as C0. Suppose N(t) denotes the total number of 
contracts renewed in a given interval of time period [0, t]. Then, for this interval 
of time, the total contracting cost will be C0•N(t). In other words, we assume that 
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the contracting cost remains the same over time and is independent of the contract 
length or other terms of the contract. We also assume that this cost is same to both 
the parties, i.e., the oil company and the drilling rig firm. It can be seen that a 
higher contracting cost would drive the firms sign a contract with a longer period. 
Factor 2 (Market Dynamics and the Potential Perceived Loss): After a 
contract is signed at some day-rate for a length of say n months, there will be up 
and down movement of the day-rate due to market dynamics. Suppose that the 
day-rate goes up significantly within the n months’ time interval. Although neither 
of the two parties can do anything about it, the oil company would feel happy that 
it had made the right decision while the rig company might feel that it should have 
signed a shorter contract. If the day-rate should drop significantly instead of rising, 
the opposite effect would take place. Hence, before the contract is signed, both the 
parties would contemplate upon the future perceived loss or gain, and we term this 
as “potential perceived loss/gain.” The extent of this loss/gain will be affected by 
the market dynamics being experienced by the contracting parties. However, 
without loss of generality, we call this loss function.  
Let R0 denote the contracted day-rate signed in by both the parties. This will 
reflect the prevailing average day-rate. Let Rt be the expected day-rate at time t. 
Then, if Rt < R0, the oil company will bear a perceived loss (R0 – Rt) at time t. If  
Rt > R0, the rig firm will bear a perceived loss (Rt – R0) at time t. In the spirit of 
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Black and Scholes (1973) framework on options pricing, we assume that Rt 




t eRR =                          (1-1) 
where ( )ttNYt 2,~ σμ  is a Brownian motion with drift coefficient μ  and 
variance parameter 2σ . Geometric Brownian motion has been used in option 
pricing models for describing the movement of stock price, which is similar to the 
day-rate issue in our setting. It is a random walk in continuous-time that the 
logarithm of the randomly varying quantity follows a Brownian motion. 
Following this framework, Rt may take any value strictly greater than zero, and 
only the fractional changes of the random variate are significant. Note that option 
value is evaluated by positive values only because if the option value is negative, 
the option will not be exercised. Whereas in our settings, the perceived loss can be 
either positive (perceived as a loss) or negative (perceived as a gain). Hence we 
cannot directly apply the option value models such as the famed Black-Scholes 
Model, but need to derive a new set of results. The expected perceived loss at time 
t is the difference between the contracted day-rate and the expected prevailing 
day-rate at time t: 











               (1-2a) 











               (1-2b) 
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We note that when 0
2
1 2 <+ σμ , Rt is lower than R0, the oil firm will expect to 
bear a perceived loss at time t. Otherwise, the rig company will have a perceived 
loss. Since this perceived loss/gain can be said to occur through the period for 
which the contract is signed, its potential effect at the time of contract signing can 
be found by integrating the loss function ( tL ) over the whole contract period. 
Suppose the contract length is k. Then we get the loss function:  
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Note that loss function is actually the same for both the parties but with opposite 
signs7.  
Of course, loss for one will be the gain for the other, and we assume that the 
party that expects the loss would be driving the contract length simply because for 
the other party any long-term contract is appealing. If the oil company expects a 
rising day-rate in future, i.e. 0
2
1 2 >+ σμ , it will always prefer a long contract 
since there is no tradeoff between contracting cost and perceived loss. Further, a 
rising day-rate implies that the rigs are in great demand which in turn implies that 
the rig firms are more likely than the oil companies to be dictating terms and 
                                                 
7 By this assumption we are avoiding the issue of one party being smarter or more 
clairvoyant than the other.  
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conditions. Hence, we argue that under this condition, the rig firm will play a 
more active role in deciding the contract length. In contrary, the oil company will 
make a decision when the day-rate is in a declining trend. For simplicity of 
operation, we define a dummy variable as follows: 
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d                           (1-4) 
Hence if d=0, the loss function should follow the form for oil company; and if d=1, 
the loss function should be the same as the one for rig firm. Thus the modified 






































    (1-6) 
When the market rate is rising (i.e. 0
2
1 2 >+ σμ ) we use the loss function for 
rig firms in our model to study the decision for contract length. Otherwise, we will 
use the one for oil companies.  
Also, note that both parties will prefer a longer contract when the expected 
market day-rate is going to be stable i.e. without much turbulence. If the day-rate 
is going to fluctuate significantly, both parties would like to shorten the contract 
length by making a tradeoff between contracting cost and the loss from the 
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fluctuation. Thus, apart from the trend (i.e. day-rate movement) the degree of 
fluctuation also plays a role.  
The two factors, namely, contracting cost and the expected day-rate trend 
coupled with fluctuation, thus address jointly the fundamental trade-off 
phenomenon between the contracting cost and the potential perceived loss 
function driven by the market dynamics. These two forces appear to be more 
technical in nature and focus on the current contract only. However, in every B2B 
contract the parties would be driven by some goals that go beyond the contract 
under focus, which nevertheless affects the terms of the focal contract8. For 
example, when Exxon Mobil signs a particular contract with a driller to drill an oil 
well in a new oil tract, they will have in mind the overall objective of achieving an 
optimum rate of well drilling in the whole tract. However, to a researcher these 
super-goals are not observed. Nevertheless, these super-goals do affect the 
contract length. We now focus our attention on modeling this unobserved factor. 
Factor 3 (Cost to Form a New Relationship): When two firms start 
negotiating to enter into a contract, they will actually be thinking of not just the 
immediate contract but also the possible future contracts between them as driven 
by some super goals that go beyond the focal contract. In other words, in many 
cases, the contracting parties would be thinking of engaging each other beyond the 
                                                 
8 For example, when LA Lakers signed Phil Jackson as its coach a few years back, 
they had the tacit understanding that they would continue partnering with each 
other until the LA Lakers could win the NBA cup. Of course, they would never 
put this in writing due to legal complications. 
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immediate contract under discussion. We call this factor “relationship factor”. 
Although neither party would commit to the other on this, they might sometimes 
mention in the press about the possibility of engaging each other for an extended 
period of time, or mention it in the contract itself through “options”. For example, 
if Exxon Mobil enters into discussion with Global Santa Fe, a rig company, for 
hiring rigs to drill wells in a new oil tract in West Africa, they would include in 
the contract the option of signing more contracts later. We treat this as the 
relationship factor that exceeds the length of the current contract. To our 
knowledge this factor has largely been ignored in the literature. 
This relationship factor will affect the length of a contract in the following 
way. Suppose that a contracting party breaks away from a relationship and tries to 
enter into a relationship with another party. There will be significant cost involved 
in the process because it will have to search for a party that has the perfect 
complementary working skills and capabilities, and has the inclination to help it 
achieve its super goals. The switching cost incurred in ushering in a new 
relationship is different from the cost we discussed as Factor 1 (i.e. the one 
involved with signing a new contract). While contracting cost (i.e. Factor 1) is 
technical in nature, the relationship switching cost is more about the working 
chemistry between two parties. 
In order to model the relationship cost, we look at the length of the 
relationship. Let t1 denote the length of the intrinsic relationship between an oil 
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company and a rig company, in the sense that the relationship won’t last beyond t1 
but could terminate before t1. This of course will be determined by the type of the 
oil company/rig firm engaged in the relationship, the drilling service involved, the 
familiarity between the two firms, and the market trend, etc. We use the 
Proportional Hazard Model (PHM) framework to study the length of the 
relationship and the impact of various factors on the relationship. We modify the 
normal PHM by forcing 1)( 1 =tF , i.e. the relationship cannot last beyond the 
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where c is the parameter for baseline weibull distribution, Z is the vector 
containing all the covariates and β  is the vector for corresponding coefficients. 
See Appendix A for details.  
After the termination of a relationship, either firm will pay the following cost 
to form a new relationship with a third party: 
( )10 tTRS −⋅=                         (1-8) 
where ( )1tT −  is the residual time needed by a firm to carry on with its work. In 
the case of the oil company, it would be the time needed to complete the drilling 
in its oil tract. For the rig firm, it would be the remaining life of the rig. For the 
sake of analytical tractability, we assume T to be the same for both. The cost of 
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starting a new relationship (i.e. terminating the current relationship) will depend 
on this ( )1tT − . For example, if the oil company needs 5 years of drilling services 
for its oil tract and a relationship ends at the second year, there will be 3 years to 
go when it looks for another relationship. The cost in this case should be higher 
than the cost when there is only 3 months of work left, since the oil company is 
more serious in the searching process. Similarly, the rig firm that is handling an 
old rig would find it less expensive to break the relationship. 
 Having defined the three key factors, namely, the contracting cost, the 
expected day-rate trend and its fluctuation, and the relationship length we now 
define the objective function that we seek to optimize. 
Objective Function 
The contracting parties would like to decide on two aspects: the anticipated 
relationship (t1) and an optimal contract length (k) for the immediate contract. The 
objective function is formed as    
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( )kL is given by equation (1-6) and 1|)(' ttF is given by equation (A.5) in Appendix 
A.  
Equation 1-9 gives the decision process of the firms over their planning 
horizon [0, T]. As we discussed earlier, for the oil companies, T refers to the total 
time needed for drilling an oil tract; and for the rig firms, T refers to the life time 
of a rig. We assume the length of T is known to the firms.  
The first term in equation 1-9 (i.e. the integration part) indicates the total cost 
within the relationship time frame [0, t1]. Based on the information of total work 
(T), the firms will try to find out an anticipated relationship (t1) as their goal in 
looking for partners. But since this relationship is not committed, the actual 
relationship may stop at time t (t < t1) with probability 1|)(' ttF . The total number of 
contracts signed within this actual relationship will be N(t). Suppose the contracts 
are signed so frequently that we can describe it using a smooth density function 
N’(t), which gives the number of contracts signed per unit time. Then 1/ N’(t) is 
the contract length. The first term inside the square brackets thus gives us the total 
contracting cost, and the second term shows the loss function as a function of 
contract length. Note that here we only consider the loss for the first contract 
signed during the whole relationship. This is because once the first contract gets to 
its end, the firm will have another chance to re-design the relationship and 
negotiate the next contract. The whole thinking process will restart and another 
relationship length and contract length can be decided accordingly.  
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Equation 1-9 poses a dynamic problem, which is solved using dynamic 
optimization methods. The optimal contract length and optimal relationship length 








































−  given by equation 1-7, L(k) given by equation 1-6, 1|)(' ttF  
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For the details of the derivation, please see Appendix B.  
Implications of Theoretical Model 
The proposed theoretical model provides a method to derive the optimal 
trade-off one has to make between the contracting costs involved with frequent 
contracting and the fear of perceived loss one would incur in a long contract. It 
also shows us the mutual impact the contract length and the long term relationship 
length has on each other. However, given the implicit nonlinear functional form of 
the optimal contract length and relationship length, it is not easy to draw a straight 
forward conclusion on the effects of the variables because we have to solve the 
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two simultaneous equations. Hence, we resort to numerical analysis. By assuming 
certain values for the variables, we solve the two simultaneous equations for the 
optimal contract length (k) and relationship length (t1) by making changes on each 
variable. We solve the optimal values in Mathematica 5.1.  
    We use an artificial example in which we specify the baseline condition 
as: 1−=μ ; 2.02 =σ ; c=1 for the baseline hazard rate (which is reduced to an 
exponential distribution); 0=βZ  (no impacts from covariates); c0=1 for unit 
contracting cost and R0=3 for starting day-rate.9  
First, let’s look at the effects of contracting cost, which is shown in Table 1.1. 
We change the value of contracting cost from 0.1 to 5.010. The optimal solutions 
show that as contracting cost increases, both the relationship length and contract 
length are increasing. This is consistent with our expectation that higher cost in 
contracting per time will make the firms sign less frequently. 
Next, Table 1.2 gives the effects of the covariates (Zβ) in the hazard function. 
We see that as covariates increase, both relationship length and contract length are 
decreasing. Recall that covariates are influencing the hazard rate, which we 
                                                 
9 This example shows a situation with μ+0.5σ2<0, which means that the oil 
company will make a decision on the contract length. We just use it as an 
illustration. Analysis on the situations when rig firms make decisions is omitted 
here.  
10 Note that the unit of the cost should be the same as that of day-rate (R0). In this 
analysis we keep R0=3.0. Hence for a typical contract for Jack-up rig in a range of 
$30,000, the contracting cost we assumed is in the range of [1000, 50000]. This is 
consistent with the information we learnt from the industry.  
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assume to be a proportional hazard rate with weibull baseline distribution. Hence 
higher covariates increase the hazard rate and then result in a lower survivorship 
probability, which means the relationship will end earlier. The numbers in the 
solutions confirmed this deduction. We will discuss the choice of covariate 
variable in more details in the empirical analysis.  
Table 1.1 Effects of Contracting Cost 
c0 t1 k 
0.1 0.0334 0.0333 
0.5 0.1732 0.1624 
1.0 0.3678 0.3011 
2.0 0.7643 0.4823 
3.0 1.1133 0.5811 
5.0 1.6601 0.6765 
 
Table 1.2 Effects of Covariates 
Zβ t1 k 
-2.0 0.4725 0.3622 
-1.0 0.4360 0.3417 
0.0 0.3678 0.3011 
1.0 0.2734 0.2387 
2.0 0.1781 0.1661 
3.0 0.1033 0.1006 
 
Table 1.3 Effects of Market Uncertainty 
2σ  t1 k 
0.0 0.3759 0.3019 
0.1 0.3719 0.3015 
0.2 0.3678 0.3011 
0.5 0.3553 0.2996 
1.0 0.3335 0.2965 
1.9 0.2923 0.2887 
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Another important component influencing the decision process is the 
uncertainties in the future day-rate. The firms will predict the future day-rate 
through our formulation of Rt by equation 1-1, hence the magnitude of 2σ  gives 
the degree of uncertainty of the prediction11. Table 1.3 shows the situations as the 
oil company is more uncertain about future ( 2σ increases), it is optimal for them 
to choose shorter relationship length and contract length.  
IV. Data and Empirical Findings 
We use the data from US oil drilling industry to test if our model is able to 
capture the key ingredients of the actual contracting process happening in this 
industry. The data consist of the contracts drawn up to hire the Jack-up rigs in the 
Gulf of Mexico region from 1999 to 2006. For each contract, we have the 
information of the day-rate, the starting and ending date of the contract, the 
drilling company and the oil company involved, the rig technical specifications 
including the age and its technical generation, and other details.  
The dependent variables are contract length and relationship length, which 
are given by equation 1-10 and 1-11 respectively. Normal error terms are added in 
both equations for estimation purpose. As we discussed earlier, we will use the 
loss function that can capture the behaviors of both rig firms and oil companies, 
which is given by equation 1-6. The drift coefficient μ  and variance parameter 
                                                 
11 Here we only consider the effects of σ2rather than μ, because the incentive to 
adjust for uncertainties is “related to the variability of the price level, not to its 
mean rate of change” (Gray (1978) pp3, footnote 3).  
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2σ  for the Brownian motion are manipulated from the data using the average 
day-rate in market in 6 months back12. We then work out the dummy variable d 
according to equation 1-4.    
The covariates selected for the PHM include: 
y Avg. length: dummy variable equals to 1 if market average contract length is 
increasing over the last period, 0 if not; 
y Rig number: total number of rigs owned by the rig firm; 
y Total: total number of contracted days of the oil company; 
y History: number of contracts signed before between the oil company and the 
rig firm; 
y Water depth: maximum water depth for the contract, measured in foot.  
The two simultaneous nonlinear equations are estimated jointly by Full 
Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method. The estimation results are 
reported in Table 1.4. All the parameters get significant estimations with 
p-value<0.0001, which strongly proves the validity of our theoretical model. 
Contracting cost is significant and with expected sign. Hazard rate here is 




                                                 
12 Since ( ) ),(~lnln 20 ttNRRt σμ− , we estimate ∑∑= ttμμˆ , similar rules apply to σ2. 
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Table 1.4. Parameter Estimation 
Parameter Estimate Approx Std Err 
c0 (contracting cost) 5.0224 0.1448 
c (baseline hazard) 1.1586 0.0253 
constant (baseline hazard) 4.3852 0.0948 
Avg. length -0.6579 0.0688 
Rig number 0.0837 0.0040 
Total -0.0195 0.0005 
History 0.0540 0.0022 
Water depth -0.0313 0.0011 
It is more interesting to look at the effects of the covariates13 as we 
considered. Note that higher covariate value will result in shorter relationship 
                                                 
13 For clarification purpose, we also ran the analysis on the separated estimations 
for the two contracting parties (i.e. under two scenarios of upward or downward 
trend of dayrates), and got the following results: 
Rig Firm Oil Company 
Parameter Estimate Std Err Parameter Estimate Std Err 
c0  2.5471 0.1752 c0  2.0191 0.2151 
c 1.1063 0.0615 c  1.1891 0.1045 
constant  5.7684 0.2553 constant 5.8722 0.8966 
Avg. length -0.8487 0.0850 Avg. length -0.1854 0.0538 
Rig number -0.0122 0.0081 Rig number 0.1732 0.0379 
Total -0.0562 0.0053 Total -0.0322 0.0068 
History 0.2009 0.0147 History 0.0896 0.0227 
Water depth -0.0292 0.0019 Water depth -0.0547 0.0116 
The estimations across the 2 sets of data are consistent; with one exception on rig 
firm's side that the rig firm's scale (rig number) is not significant. The other 
estimates are all significant and also consistent with the "joint" estimation as 
we got before. 
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length and contract length. Hence the covariates with positive coefficient will 
shorten the two lengths whereas those with negative coefficients will prolong the 
lengths. Specifically,  
y When the market has a trend to sign longer contract, it will push the firms to 
choose longer contracts. The result shows that individual firm’s decision can 
be influenced by the market trend. When most of the firms are choosing long 
term contracts, their confidence in the future market will influence the rest of 
the firms to choose similar contract lengths.  
y Larger rig firms who have more rigs in hand tend to choose shorter contracts. 
This is consistent with our observation in the industry. Firms with more rigs 
in hand, especially in one area, are more flexible to move their rigs and are 
less concerned on idling cost, etc. For example, Transocean, who owns 23 
rigs in GOM area, has an average contract length of 35 days over the 7 years 
period. Whereas Black Offshore, who has only 2 rigs in the area, has an 
average contract length over 180 days.  
y Oil companies who have larger oil tracts tend to look for longer relationship 
and sign longer contract. This result is consistent with our model that as the 
total time needed for drilling increasing, the oil company will prefer a longer 
relationship to avoid the cost to form a new one.  
y With more number of contracts signed before, the increased familiarity 
between the oil company and the rig firm will make them choose shorter 
contracts. One reason for this surprising result is that the familiarity between 
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two firms will make their negotiation process easier, hence the two parties 
are more concerned in the perceived loss from market fluctuation rather than 
the contracting cost. In consequence, they have the incentive to sign shorter 
contracts. This result is consistent with the findings by Corts and Singh 
(2004) who find that repeated interactions will make firms less likely to 
choose fixed-price contract, a form of contracts we treat as long term 
contracts with less contracting cost. 
y As the water depth increases, there is a higher technical requirement on the 
drilling service. The parameter shows that such technical difficulties prolong 
the contract length. The reason may be that there are fewer rigs which are 
capable for difficult services and the investment is usually higher, hence 
making the relationship and contract more serious and longer.  
V.  Contributions and Future Studies 
This B2B-Service market has been growing rapidly in the past decade for 
several reasons. First, major businesses such as HP and Toyota have been 
outsourcing their non-core activities such as logistics and procurement to third 
parties. Secondly, the exploding growth in Asia has been attracting many 
businesses to the Asian markets, and the B2B-Service companies facilitate that 
entry through providing their ready-to-hire services. Third, the increasing world 
trade among the countries has resulted in more demand for these services.  
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Our research is perhaps a first step in understanding the business dynamics in 
this market. In the marketing literature, B2B market is an under-studied area and 
there is only a limited amount of theoretical or empirical work on the topic of 
contracting. Thus, our research will be a valuable contribution to the literature.  
Our informal survey among the various companies in the industry indicate to 
us that currently many of them use their “gut feel” and market “sentiments” to 
work on their contract. Hence, our model can turn out to be a handy framework 
for both the oil companies and drilling companies when they want to draw up a 
contract. For example, our model reveals the degree of impact the various factors 
have on contracting length, and this information can be used by the oil and gas 
industry. In fact, we intend to develop a normative model based on the current 
framework and come up with a few recommendations for the industry.  
Although we discuss our model in the oil drilling setting, the components of 
the model are not limited to this industry only. The contracting cost, the market 




Appendix A: Modified PHM 
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which gives us ( )[ ]βZttF c expexp1)( −−= . Note that in PHM, F(t) will reach 1 only 
when t goes to infinity. Since our framework requires that there exist t1 that 1)( 1 =tF , 
we modify the above probability by 
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as appeared in equation 1-9 and 1-11. 
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Appendix B: Optimization 
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as shown in equation 1-10.  
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Here, we make an approximation that 
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Modeling the Supply and Utilization 












In marketing literature, a lot has been written on how new consumer 
durables diffuse in a market or how businesses grow in a new market. Researchers 
look at how word of mouth and marketing instruments such as price affect the 
demand growth of a new product in a market (Bass, Krishnan, and Jain (1994)). 
Interestingly, most of the products considered in the extant literature are of 
mass-production type and are “physical” in nature i.e. not service goods. These 
two characteristics give some unique advantages to the suppliers of these goods. 
First, a physical good, once adopted by a consumer, cannot be disowned and 
returned to the supplier. Second, the ability to mass-produce helps to lower the 
marginal cost of production, which implies that the suppliers can instantly adjust 
their production volume to meet a change in market demand. 
Let us now consider the service sector that operates in the B2B 
(Business-to-Business) markets. There are many companies that are engaged in 
providing different kinds of services to business clients. Some of these service 
companies have to invest heavily in capital assets in order to provide their services. 
For example, the 3PL service companies (i.e. Third-party Logistics) such as UPS 
and CAT Logistics, who provide comprehensive logistics services to big clients 
like HP and Dell, have their own warehouses built in various parts of the world, 
set-up exhaustive delivery infrastructure and installed various high-tech tracking 
systems. Similarly, shipping companies such as Nedlloyd invest in buying in big 
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ships and oil-tankers, companies servicing construction industry invest in huge 
cranes and other earth moving machineries, ERP14 companies invest in extensive 
human assets, and drilling rig companies such as Noble and Transocean who hire 
out their rigs to oil companies for drilling oil wells have to invest heavily in 
acquiring these rigs. For these companies that primarily use their capital assets in 
order to provide services to their B2B clients, the success depends largely on how 
effectively they utilize (i.e. hire out) their assets over their life span. 
In established markets, the demand for the B2B-Services is more or less 
stable. However, in a new market, the requirement for their services will generally 
grow over time as their clients’ businesses grow in the new market. For example, 
UPS recently entered the Asian market to serve its various clients in the 
construction, mass-retailing, leisure and high-tech industries, who themselves had 
only a few years back entered Asia to operate in the burgeoning Chinese and 
Indian markets. Similarly, drilling rigs would like to serve the oil companies that 
decide to extract oil from a newly discovered oil field.  
Would the demand growth for B2B-Services in a new market be very 
similar to that of a consumer durable in a new market? It need not be for the 
following reasons. First, the customers are only a few in numbers who will repeat 
buying the services, unlike in the case of a consumer durable where the individual 
households are many in number and each of who buys just once. Secondly, the 
                                                 
14 Enterprise Resource Planning software includes SAP and Oracle. 
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demand for B2B-Services from these clients will be driven by the downstream 
demand these clients face in turn. For example, demand for crane-services 
solicited by construction companies will be driven by the demand faced by them 
from the real estate developers. Similarly, the demand for rig services from oil 
companies for drilling oil wells in a new oil field will be driven in turn by the 
demand for oil in the downstream market. Third, being a service product, the 
demand can be curtailed at any time. For example, if the downstream demand for 
oil goes down, oil companies may decide to stop hiring the rigs abruptly15. 
Similarly, if the construction companies experience a drop in real estate prices in 
the downstream market, they can stop hiring the cranes abruptly. 
In sum, the above-mentioned three reasons imply that the demand for 
B2B-Services in a new market is more likely to have sharp ups and downs, unlike 
the demand for physical consumer goods in a new market which typically has a 
smooth diffusion (i.e. rise and fall) pattern. Let us take the rig services industry as 
an example. We can take the rig-hiring as a service product and analyze how it 
diffuses over time in a new oil field. In other words, we can analyze at what rate 
the rig-contracts are signed in a new oil field and see if it shows any particular 
                                                 
15 The abrupt turns can happen in the B2B markets because the customers are 
only few in number, and hence each individual’s decision will show up as a major 
event, unlike in a consumer durable market.  
 42
pattern16. In Figure 2.1 below we provide the rig-contracts in the Gulf of Mexico 
(GOM) region from Jan 1984 till June 1992. 
Figure 2.1 Number of Rig-Contracts in GOM Region 
 
An obvious thing to notice here is that the demand does not seem to follow 
the typical gradual rise & fall diffusion pattern but seems to have sharp ups and 
downs, as explained earlier. One can conjecture that the customers (i.e. oil 
companies) seem to be changing their hiring decision based on certain short-term 
                                                 
16 Since our research uses the rig services data, a short description will be useful 
for the reader. Oil companies such as Shell and Exxon-Mobil Oil lease-in new oil 
fields from the respective country governments, and explore. If successful at 
finding reasonable amount of oil and gas, they start extracting them through 
drilling oil wells using the drilling rigs hired from rig companies such as Ensco 
and Noble. They move the rigs gradually across the new oil field drilling oil wells 
all over the field. The oil thus produced is sent to refineries for further processing 
before it is sold to various customers. The rate of oil production would depend on 
the rate of demand changes for the refined oil, and hence the demand growth of 
rig services in the new oil field depends on the demand faced by the oil companies 
in the downstream market. If the reader wants more details on the drilling rig 
sector of the oil & gas industry, we suggest two Harvard cases: The Offshore 











fluctuations in the downstream market. For them, the decision to hire or fire a 
drilling rig service at a given point of time is driven largely by what’s happening 
in their downstream market such as changes in crude oil price and demand for oil, 
oil inventory in the storage tanks and refineries, oil output from other oil fields etc. 
Note that it does not mean the oil companies do not have long-term strategic view, 
but only means that with respect to hiring the rig services they look into short term 
changes happening in their downstream markets.  
If the demand for services does not show any smooth pattern, how would 
the B2B-Service providers plan to make their assets available for clients to hire? 
In the case of rig services, for example, the rig companies have to worry about the 
long-term impact of their decisions because rigs are not mass-production items. It 
takes roughly 2 years to manufacture one rig and the marginal production cost per 
rig is very high17 and hence the rig companies cannot adjust their supply pattern 
on short notices18. Although rig companies own many rigs which might be 
operating in different oil fields around the globe, it takes time and huge efforts to 
move rigs around instantaneously19. Thus, it can be expected that these service 
providers (i.e. drilling rig companies) take a long-term approach and plan well in 
advance the demand requirements expected to arise from a new oil field. In short, 
                                                 
17 A jack-up rig costs around US $ 200 million to produce.  
18 As mentioned in the Introduction section, this is a key difference between 
suppliers of consumer durable (physical) goods and the service providers in the 
B2B-Services market. 
19 It takes around a US $ 1 million, a conservative estimate, to move a rig from 
Africa to the GOM. Further, they may be under contracts elsewhere and so could 
not be moved anyway.  
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in this industry drilling rig companies ought to take a calculated approach to 
deciding on investment in rigs and making them available in an oil field. In Figure 
2.2 we give the number of rigs that were made available during Jan 1984 - June 
1992 by the rig companies in the GOM region for the oil companies to hire.  
Figure 2.2 Number of Rigs Available for Hire in GOM Region 
 
It is clear from Figure 2.2 that the actual supply of rigs to an oil field by 
the rig companies seems to follow a uniform rise & fall pattern, suggesting that 
perhaps a long-term thinking dominates the rig companies’ decision on this! The 
rig companies tend to calculate the expected demand growth for their rigs in an oil 
field and systematically make them available for the oil companies to hire.  
We believe that a similar logic is also likely to prevail in the other 
B2B-Services companies such as UPS and Nedlloyd. The basic rationale is that 
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order from their business clients. If UPS wants to convince HP to outsource the 
logistics business, they have to first make available the warehouse, delivery 
infrastructure etc. to handle the HP’s logistics business. Thus, when we look at the 
B2B-Serivces, the service providers (i.e. suppliers) have the necessity to look into 
the long-term demand growth for their services from their clients.  
However, as saw earlier, their clients are more likely to worry about the 
short-term fluctuations with respect to hiring those services, implying that the 
actual services that would be hired will always be less than what have been made 
available by the B2B-Services companies. The ratio “hired / supply”, also called 
the Utilization Ratio (or Load Factor, as is commonly named in service industries), 
when measured over time will reflect the dynamics involved in how the oil 
companies choose to hire rigs from the available lot. In other words, by analyzing 
the UR (i.e. Utilization Rate) pattern over time, we can find out what factors affect 
the eventual hiring pattern of rigs in a new oil field. For example, since an idled 
rig means a huge potential loss, rig companies would actively trying to increase 
the UR of their rigs through adjusting the contract terms. When employed by oil 
companies, rigs get around US $60,000 to $200,000 per day20, and while idling, it 
costs around US $35,000 to maintain the rigs. So, idling time results in a potential 
loss of around US $100,000 per day for the drilling companies. Thus, UR(t) is one 
metric both the oil companies and the rig companies seriously consider in their 
                                                 
20 For this reason, the hiring cost is talked in terms of “day-rate” in this industry.  
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decisions. In fact, it is widely acknowledged that UR is a ratio that is used in 
almost all service industries. 
Thus, the B2B-Services industry offers something that is unique to the 
marketing literature. This industry differs a lot from the consumer durables 
markets that we normally analyze. Also, while in traditional diffusion models we 
rarely focus on the supply side dynamics of a new consumer durable product21, in 
the B2B-Service markets we need to focus on both the determinants of the supply 
side dynamics and those of the demand side dynamics. Analyzing the supply and 
hiring pattern of their services in a new area will bring more insights into how the 
industry operates. Since outsourcing of non-core activities of a company has 
become the norm of the day, it is important that this particular B2B-Services 
industry is analyzed and understood better. Our analysis will also help companies 
such as Keppel Fells and Siemens that engage in manufacturing and selling of the 
assets that the B2B-Services industry uses. Further, stock analysts who focus on 
B2B-Serices sector might find our analysis useful. Note however that our 
objective is not analyzing any optimal behavior of the service providers or that of 
their clients with respect to hiring of the services, but only to build a model that 
                                                 
21 Note that a few marketing research papers have analyzed how diffusion is 
affected by “restricted” supply conditions (Jain, Mahajan, and Muller 1991). 
However, the focus of those models is still consumer goods, i.e. mass-produced 
physical goods. They don’t talk about the determinant of supply conditions, but 
looks at what happens to demand if supply is restricted. In our paper, our focus on 
B2B-Serivices market and we look at the supply side dynamics directly.  
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explains their behavior pattern. We believe that our approach will apply to many 
other B2B-Serivces companies as well. 
II. Literature Survey22  
Business research in the oil and gas industry is typically limited to the area 
of economics where they analyze the bidding behavior of the oil companies when 
governments open up the oil fields for development and extraction of oil 
(Hendricks and Porter (1992)), the option valuation of off-shore oil fields leases 
(Paddock, Siegel, and Smith (1988)), the investment timing decision on drilling on 
offshore wildcat tracts (Hendricks and Porter (1996)), the contracts entered into by 
the oil companies with the rig owners (Corts and Singh (2004)), and the general 
industry structure (Porter (1995)). To our knowledge, there has been no attempt at 
understanding or modeling the hiring pattern of rigs in a new oil field.  
A second stream of research papers that deal with demand modeling can 
be found in the time series literature. For example, sophisticated time series 
models (e.g. Brannas and Nordstrom (2004), Wang (2004)) have been used to 
derive the long-run demand patterns, but these papers look for stationary time 
series and not a series where the variable of interest grows with time. Hence, for 
the purpose of modeling the rig hiring process in a new oil field these methods are 
                                                 
22 From now onwards we focus purely on the rig services while stressing that the 
logic underlying our model will be applicable to other companies in the 
B2B-Serivices industry also.  
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not suitable23. Further, the time series models may be good for predicting a 
process but not for controlling it because they lack descriptive power.  
Another stream of literature that bears resemblance to our research is the 
diffusion model developed in marketing literature to analyze the demand growth 
of a new consumer durable in a society. Since we have already explained how our 
research compares and contrasts with the diffusion modeling in detail in the 
Introduction chapter, here we simply give some references from that literature. 
These include the classic Bass model (1969) and other extensions such as Bass, 
Krishnan, and Jain (1994)24.  We later compare our results with a prominent 
diffusion model.  
Thus, we find that the marketing or economics research literature has not 
analyzed how the suppliers in a B2B-Services industry behave with respect to 
meeting the demand growth in a new market. Note that this industry is growing at 
a very fast rate since companies are increasingly outsourcing their non-core 
activities to these service providers so that they can focus on their core activities. 
The industry is growing so fast that another sector called 4PL (i.e. Fourth-Party 
Logistics) has come up where companies like IBM play a key role in helping the 
                                                 
23 Nevertheless we do compare the performance of our proposed model with that 
of a time-series model in Section V later.  
24 Since the diffusion literature in marketing is really huge, we are focusing only 
on the two papers that we use for explanation purpose now and benchmarking 
purposes later. Reader is advised to look into books such as New Product 
Diffusion Models by Mahajan, Muller, and Wind (2000) for other papers in this 
area. 
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3PL companies streamline their services activities. Hence, we believe that it is 
right time that marketing starts paying attention to how these service markets 
evolve. In this paper, we attempt at taking the first step in that direction. 
As mentioned before, although there are many industries that qualify for 
our research (i.e. 3PL, shipping, oil drilling, etc.), we take for consideration the 
drilling rig market for three reasons. First, we have a wide knowledge in this 
industry from a colleague who is an engineer with more than 10 years of 
experience in this industry, and he has worked in different types of oil rigs in 
different parts of the world. This helps us build a model that is not only 
academically interesting but also relevant to the industry. Secondly, we were able 
to get a wide range of data that we use to empirically test our model. Thirdly, in 
this industry new oil fields are being discovered quite periodically and hence we 
have data pertaining to the supply and demand patterns that are unique to new 
areas, which is the focus of this research. 
In our research, we will first derive appropriate supply function and UR 
function, and test them empirically using the data that have been made available to 
us. Section III is devoted to the theoretical building up of the model. We will 
show in Section IV how the proposed models stand the empirical tests. In Section 
V we will compare the performance with a prominent diffusion model, and in 
Section VI we will conclude the paper.  
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III. Model 
Our basic objective is to develop a model to track the supply of and 
demand for rig services in a new oil field. Since it is difficult to include in our 
analysis all the oil fields around the world we focus our attention to modeling the 
rig supply and hiring pattern in one of the key and large oil fields. It is the GOM 
(Gulf of Mexico) offshore field. Further, it is generally expensive to move a rig 
from one field to another and hence, to a large extent, short time fluctuations in 
demand tend to get restrained within an oil field and hence focusing the model 
within one oil field is not inappropriate. We assume that rigs are hired on a 
3-months contract basis25. We also assume that all the contracts in a given period 
have the same start and end dates. We make this assumption for analytical 
convenience only.  
As mentioned in the previous section, rig owners position their rigs in an 
oil field with a long-term strategic view in mind (i.e. expecting contracts from the 
oil companies over time) but do not expect all rigs to be employed all the times 
when the contracts are drawn up. However, the rig owners do get calls to bid from 
the oil companies and hence every rig (that is positioned in the area) can be 
expected to be hired at any given time period.    
                                                 
25 In the GOM region 3 months is the normal period of a contract. Kenyon and 
Tompaidis (2001) also use the 3-months contract as the base contract when 
studying the impact of idle time (i.e. the inactive time between two consecutive 
leases) on the day-rates and their option values.  
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Thus, there are two types of patterns to model as explained before. First is 
the supply pattern (i.e. the number of rigs-for-hire made available in the oil field) 
and the second is the demand pattern (i.e. regarding the number of rigs actually 
hired). The two patterns were graphically given in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 in the 
Introduction section.  
Let SR(t) and SC(t) denote respectively the number of rigs available in the 
oil field at time period t and the number of rigs actually hired (or the number of 
contracts signed) at time period t. Let UR(t) be the ratio of demand to supply at 
time t i.e. SC(t) / SR(t). Note here that the time period of interest is 3-month. We 
will first focus on the long-term oriented supply pattern (SR(t)) and then model the 
short-term oriented demand pattern UR(t). 
3.1  Long-term oriented (Supply side) SR(t): 
Our industry knowledge and discussion with industry people suggest that 
the supply of rigs by the rig owners to meet the demand from a new oil field is 
largely driven by the amount of oil available in the oil field and the rate at which it 
is extracted. There are mainly three factors that are essential for estimating the 
required number of rigs to be kept ready at time t.26  
                                                 
26 Although rigs are only hired to extract oil, rig companies work very closely 
with the oil companies and hence have wide knowledge on the extraction process 
and the general conditions in an oil field.  
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Factor 1: First is the amount of oil that is left in the field at t. If we know 
the total capacity of the oil field, then we could calculate the oil remaining at time 
t by subtracting the total volume of oil that has been extracted up to time t from 
the total capacity. However, it is widely acknowledged that it is not possible to 
predict exactly the total capacity of an oil field27. The oil companies estimate 
initially the capacity of an oil field based on various factors (i.e. when they drill 
during the exploration stage), but keep updating their estimate as oil drilling 
progresses. Let M(t) represent the ‘estimated’ capacity of the oil field at time t and 
let G represent the unknown ‘actual’ capacity of the oil field. In other words, M(t) 
is an estimate of G made at t. Note that G is likely to be realized eventually. Thus, 
from a practical perspective the capacity of oil field (i.e. M(t)) is assumed to be 
dynamic in our model. We express both these factors M(t) and G in terms of the 
number of oil wells needed to extract the oil from this oil field. By doing this we 
abstract away from dealing with the actual volume of oil produced since each well, 
once drilled, will be operational for many years, producing a constant rate of oil 
output. In other words, we assume that the number of wells drilled is proportional 
to the amount of oil extracted from those wells. This is a reasonable assumption as 
per the industry observers. 
                                                 
27 See for example a very exciting book Twilight in the Desert by Matthew 
Simmons (2005) on the “reserves” issue in oil fields.  
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Next, we need to find the total amount of oil extracted up to time t. Note 
that this is also expressed in terms of the number of oil wells. In terms of oil wells, 
it is simply CSC(t-1). Hence we have:  
Amount of oil available at t = M(t) –CSC(t-1) 
Factor 2: The second factor is technical in nature. Of the total oil available 
at t, only a fraction could be expected to be extracted at time t. This fraction 
depends on the technology being used to extract the oil, the geological conditions, 
age of the rig employed, the number of wells drilled, etc. Since many technical 
factors play a role here, many firms28 decide on how-much-to-extract based on 
their “experience” with the oil field under focus. One good indicator of this 
experience factor is the total amount of oil that had been extracted till that time 
from that oil field29. For example, if they are able to extract 20 million barrels up 
to 5th year which is more than the 15 million barrels it achieved in another oil well 
with a similar delivery infrastructure and a similar capacity, then in year 6 it will 
have more confidence to extract and handle a higher fraction. Thus, a proxy for 
the experience is CSC(t-1) which is the total amount of oil wells drilled up to t. 
Note that, to avoid the scaling issues, we use the factor CSC(t-1)/G to capture the 
impact of experience. As mentioned earlier, G is the unknown ‘actual’ capacity of 
                                                 
28 Although oil companies hire rigs, the actual drilling operation of rigs is done 
jointly by the rig company’s employees and the oil company’s employees.  
Hence, both firms will have necessary information on this.  
29 To understand the extent to which this experience factor plays a major role in 
the oil production, one has to read Twilight in the Desert by Matthew Simmons 
(2005).   
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the oil field expressed as number of oil wells that will eventually be drilled in the 
oil field. 
Another issue, however, with the oil extraction is that there exists a limit 
on the absolute amount of oil extraction one can achieve from a given oil field in a 
said period of time. This limit is determined partly by the geological structure of 
the field –for example, a rapid oil extraction would result in a lower amount of oil 
that could be extracted out30 – and partly by the oil-delivery infrastructure that 
had been built by the oil firm. Assuming certain oil capacity, this means that there 
is a limit on the fraction of oil extractable from the oil field at time t. Letting L 
denote the upper limit, we model the expected fraction of extraction at time t as 
follows:  
Expected fraction of extraction = l + (L-l) [1 – exp(-v*{ CSC(t-1)/G})], 
where {l, L} are respectively the minimum and maximum limits 31 , and v 
represents the degree of impact of the experience factor. We use a concave 
function to bring in the conservative nature of the firms in oil extraction activities. 
Expanding the function exp(-v• CSC(t-1)/G) and considering only the first two 
terms and ignoring the higher order terms we get:  
                                                 
30 This is because the oil from surrounding areas will take some time to “seep” 
into the oil well being extracted.  
31 Although L is the one we are worried about, the presence of l is to ensure that 
the feasible amount is positive even when CSC(t) is zero.  
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Expected fraction of extraction 
= ( ) 22 )/)(()()/)(()( GtCSvlLGtCSvlLl CC −−−+ . 
Re-parameterizing the model by letting l = v1, (L-l)v = v2 and (L-l)v2 = v3, we get: 
    Expected fraction of extraction = ]/)(/)([ 22321 GtCSvGtCSvv CC −+ . 
The fraction is quadratic in the experience factor, raising initially and decreasing 
later. Note that this is the fraction of the amount expected to be extracted out of a 
certain oil capacity as estimated. If the company increases its capacity estimation 
drastically, then this “extractable” fraction will be lower because the actual limit is, 
as mentioned earlier, on the absolute amount of oil extractable. Similarly, if the oil 
company increases its oil capacity estimate then this extractable fraction would be 
higher. 
Factor 3: The third factor is the economic consideration of drilling an 
additional well at time t. Since the total amount of oil that could be extracted from 
a given oil field remains a constant, one can see that an additional well is going to 
only help in accelerating the extraction i.e. the production output speed. The 
economic benefits of this acceleration depend on the current production speed, the 
total capacity, the oil price and the discount rate. For example, if the oil price is 
higher or if the discount rate is higher then it will be more beneficial to accelerate 
the production output by drilling an additional well. However, this benefit has to 
be balanced against the cost of drilling a well which is a direct function of the 
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prevailing day-rate (i.e. the hiring rate of drilling rig). In the initial periods when 
the number of drilled wells is small and a vast capacity of the oil field remains 
untapped, it would make sense to drill more wells since the discounted future 
revenues will more than offset the drilling cost. However, in the latter years, as 
more and more wells are already producing oil, the benefits of drilling an 
additional well may not be justified against the cost of drilling the well. In other 
words, the number of wells that will be drilled in the latter years will go down due 
to sheer economic reasons, and this reduction is a function of the cumulative 
number of wells already drilled in the oil field. Since by assumption, the number 
of contracts is same as the number of wells, it can be said that CSC(t-1) negatively 
influences the new number of contracts to be signed at t. Since the impact of 
CSC(t-1) is already considered in the second factor in detail, there is no need for 
another function. However, it should be noted that the coefficients mentioned in 
Factor 2 (namely, ν1, ν2 and ν3) will also reflect the impact of Factor 3, and 
accordingly we will let these coefficients be free and estimated from the data set. 
Thus: 
Expected fraction of extraction = ]/)(/)([ 22321 GtCSvGtCSvv CC ++ . 
Putting these three factors together we can write the function for the 
number of wells expected to be drilled at t as follows32.  
                                                 
32 We use the word “expected” as is used in normal conversation and not to 
indicate any mathematical meaning to it.  
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]/)1(/)1()][1()([)( 22321 GtCSvGtCSvvtCStMtS CCCR −+−+−−=   (2-1) 
It is important to note that equation 2-1 tracks the supply variable i.e. the 
number of rig-service-contracts that are potentially made available by rig 
companies at time t. This is expressed as a function of the realized demand 
variable that is given on the right hand side. 
3.2  The Evolving Market Capacity:  
Let us now look at M(t) in equation 2-1. Recall that this is an estimate at 
time t of the actual capacity, G. At every point of time t, the firms can decide to 
add or deduct some value to the current capacity estimate. A similar observation 
was made by Lund (2000) where he says that the issue of estimating the capacity 
of oil field has to be revisited at the end of a production run. Note however that at 
any point of time, the firms will be conservative in their estimates because if they 
later find that they had overestimated the capacity they will have to idle the hired 
rigs and may end up paying a heavy penalty33. Hence, if and when they get a 
positive signal they are likely to increase their estimate. Clearly, one positive 
signal is the total fraction of the oil-wells they had drilled till then.  
Suppose that m(t) is the value to be added to (or subtracted from) the current 
estimate. Then, m(t) will depend on the CSC(t-1). Further, other factors such as 
technology might help a firm update the capacity without the influence of the 
                                                 
33 This is a common wisdom in the industry.  
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cumulative oil extracted. Call this p, and we assume that this part of the updating 
does not change with t. Thus m(t) = p + q1 CSC(t-1), where q1 measures the degree 
of impact CSC(t-1) has on m(t). The firms will also be aware that as time goes by 
and as more and more oil is extracted, the need to update keeps decreasing. Hence, 
we have an updating mechanism as follows.  
[ ],)1()]([)( 1 −+−= tCSqptMGtm C  
where G is the unknown actual capacity of the oil field34. Replacing q1 in the 
second square bracket by q/G, we get:  
        [ ]1)/G-CSc(t)]([)( qptMGtm +−=               (2-2) 
Noting that dttdMtm /)()( = , the differential equation 2-2 can be solved to yield: 





⎛ ⋅+−⋅−−= ∫t C dCSGqptMGGtM 0 )(exp)]0([)( ττ     (2-3)   
where M(0) is the initial estimate of G. As t goes to infinity M(t) approaches G.  
Equations 2-1 and 2-3 together complete the modeling of the supply side 
dynamics. Let us now focus on the demand side dynamics. 
Two points are worth mentioning here. Evolving market capacity is a 
common feature of any B2B-Services market. For example, when UPS enters 
                                                 
34 It should be noted here that although the market updating expression resembles 
the famous Bass model (1969), this is very different because there are two 
different explanatory variables on the right hand side while the Bass model 
operates on one explanatory variable only. 
 59
China, it would know that it is an expanding market and it would be difficult to 
gauge the total potential demand at the start and hence has to keep updating the 
estimate as time goes by. Secondly, the issue of changing market potential had 
caught diffusion modelers’ attention before, e.g. Jain and Rao (1990) and 
Krishnan, Bass, and Kumar (2000). However, there has been no satisfactory 
answer in those papers. Jain and Rao’s (1990) model is an empirical set-up that 
tries different ways of accommodating the price impact and in one case the price 
was found affecting the market potential. But the evolving nature of a market was 
not addressed in their article. Hence, this model cannot be said to analyze 
systematically the market size dynamics. Similarly, Krishnan, Bass and Kumar 
(2000) article models the change in the market potential at a discrete point of time 
and not in a continuous manner. 
3.3  Short-term oriented demand side dynamics UR(t): 
The demand from oil companies for the rig-services is modeled as follows. 
Noting that, as mentioned earlier, we will focus on the ratio of SC(t)/SR(t), which is 
called the Utilization Rate (UR). All the players in the oil and gas industry look at 
the UR as an important variable to make their decisions. For example, many 
gut-based decision rules in this industry depend on the UR. For example, if UR is 
less than 80% in a particular period of time it is considered below acceptable level 
since rig owners are believed to incur losses. If it is above 90% it is considered 
good, and if it is between 80 and 90% it is considered as break-even point.  
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As per the industry wisdom the UR at time t is affected by four factors. First 
is the “stickiness” factor, i.e. the oil companies tend to not make any drastic 
change in their rig hiring policy from one period to next. In other words, the 
UR(t-1) will be an important determinant of UR(t). This also takes care of the fact 
that some of the contracts are of longer than 3-month duration which is an 
assumption in our model. The second factor is the prevailing crude oil price. A 
higher oil price would make it attractive for the oil firms to extract as much oil as 
possible quickly so it can sell in the spot market immediately. Hence, oil price is 
expected to have a positive impact on the demand function. The third factor is the 
day-rate35. A higher day-rate, on the other hand, would make it expensive to do 
the extraction and hence is likely to have a negative impact on the demand 
function. The fourth factor is the seasonality. It is generally observed that demand 
for rigs changes in the winter months either to meet the increased demand for gas 
that is used for heating the buildings and residential places in the US or as a result 
of financial year end closing. Hence, the demand is expected to have some impact 
in the winter months. 
While modeling the short-term oriented demand function, we did not want 
to look at any underlying process as we did in the supply model because, by 
definition, the changes are short-term oriented and as per our discussion with the 
industry observers, no long term thinking seems to exist in this area. Hence, 
                                                 
35 As mentioned in the Introduction section, the hiring cost is expressed in terms 
of day-rate, i.e. amount of $ the rig companies charge the oil companies for every 
day of the hire.  
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putting all the four factors discussed-above together, we propose a simple 










+++−+=   (2-5) 
where OP(t) is the crude oil price at time t, DR is the day-rate of the rig and 
Season(t) is a variable that takes value 1 in the winter months and 0 otherwise.  
We expect β2 and β4 to be positive and β3 to be negative36.  
This completes the modeling of the demand side dynamics.  
IV. Empirical Estimation 
We have proposed a 2-step model to test, namely, the rig-availability (i.e. 
the supply side) model represented by equations 2-1 and 2-3, and the demand side 
model represented by equation 2-5. Since we have relevant data pertaining to each 
model, we estimate each independently of the other.  
There are many rigs available such as land-rigs (i.e. that are used on land), 
jack-up rig and submersible (meant for drilling near the shore line at a water depth 
of 200 to 300 feet), semi-submersible and drill-ship rigs (meant for drilling in 
deep water and in deeper wells), etc. In the off-shore drilling category, jack-up rig 
and semi-submersible rigs account for 70 to 80 % of the market. For empirical 
                                                 
36 The main reason for suggesting a simple model to capture the UR process is 
borne out of our discussions with the industry people. We also tried other models 
but the qualitative nature of the results remained the same. 
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testing of the proposed model we use here three data sets, one on semi- 
submersible rigs and two on jack-up rigs.  
IV-i. Data set 1 (Semi-submersible Rigs):  
What we are going to focus on first is the data on the 2nd generation 
semi-submersible rigs37. For the GOM region, we have data on the number of rigs 
available in the region (i.e. ready to be hired) and the number of rigs hired (i.e. 
contracted by oil companies) every 3 months from Jan 1984 till Feb 1993. As 
mentioned earlier, in GOM the average contract term for hiring is 3 months. We 
also have the market crude oil prices and day-rates for the period. We use PROC 
MODEL algorithm in the SAS software to estimate the parameters in the supply 
and demand models. Equation 2-3 is embedded in equation 2-1, and hence they 
are estimated as one integral equation, and equation 2-5 was estimated separately. 
The results are given in Tables 2.1.   
Interpretation of the Results 
1. For estimating equation 2-3 (i.e. dynamic market-capacity estimation model), 
we had to assume a value for one of the parameters which actually was the 
integration constant that was obtained while solving the differential equation 
                                                 
37 Newer generations come into the market for drilling in deeper oceans and to 
drill deeper wells with a significant technology innovation separating generations. 
The second generation semi-submersible, however, holds the largest market share 
of all generations. Rigs rated at less than 2,500 ft water depth are 2nd generation 
semi-submersible rigs. 
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2-2. This is M(0), the initial estimate of the total capacity of the oil field (G). 
We tried different values, from a value of 0.1 to 0.5 for the fraction M(0)/G, i.e. 
from a very conservative estimate at 10% of the eventual capacity to 50% of 
it38. On estimating the other parameters at different values of M(0), we found 
that  R-square did not change much, and hence we chose that value which 
produced significant estimates of all the other parameters, and these are 
reported in Table 2.1 (column 2). From the estimates it can be seen that oil 
firms update the oil field capacity every period based on the production output 
they realized until then and also based on technical attributes (i.e. estimates of 
both p and q are significant). 
 
Table 2.1 Semi-Submersibles (1984-1992) 
Supply side model 
 [Equations 2-1 & 2-3] 
Demand side model  
[Equations 2-5] 
Parameters Estimates Parameters Estimates
p 0.4153 β0 -2.0609
M(0) Fixed at 0.6 G β1 (UR(t-1)) 2.1723
q 0.7606 
(sig. at 5% level)
β2 (oil-price) 0.0005
G 609 β3 (day-rate) 0.0179 
(insignificant)




R-square 0.9332 R-square 0.5898
All estimates are significant at 1% level except when mentioned otherwise.  
 
                                                 
38 In fact, in the industry the term M(0)/G has a special name. It is called “reserve 
recovery”. 
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 2. Looking at the coefficients ν1, ν2 and ν3 that measure the joint impact of 
experience and economic factors on the fraction of the amount of oil 
extractable at a given point of time t we see a significant and positive impact 
of experience factor. Since coefficient of ν2 is negative while those of other 
two are positive, a moderating force seems to be acting on that impact, which 
is the economic factor. This suggests both Factor 2 and Factor 3 (i.e. explained 
in Section III) play a role. That the oil companies and rig owners place a huge 
emphasis on the “experience” factor when deciding on the actual amount to be 
extracted at a given point of time and also to update their estimates on the oil 
field capacity is a finding that is of much interest to the industry. 
3. It is interesting to note from Table 2.1 (column 4) the estimate of β1 is positive 
and significant, implying that there is considerable amount of stickiness in the 
actual hiring pattern by the oil firms. The crude oil price also plays a 
significant role (β2 is positive). Since it is positive this means that in the 
periods of higher oil price the firms hire more rigs and when oil price 
decreases they don’t hesitate to lay off the rigs immediately. However, the 
day-rate, which is the rent paid by the oil companies to the rig owners, is 
insignificant (i.e. β3 is insignificant)! It is a little surprising since the “price” 
does not seem to affect the “consumption”! Interestingly, the seasonal effect is 
also insignificant (i.e. β4 is insignificant). Although by eye-balling the data we 
do find some seasonal effect, it is not systematic across the years and hence is 
not picked up in the statistical estimation. 
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Results 1 through 3 clearly show that the number of rigs that are made 
available in a region has a long-term strategy in view (i.e. driven by the 
“experience” of the oil well) while the number of rigs that would actually be hired 
at a given point of time depends on the crude oil price, a short-term factor, and is 
independent of the day-rate! There are at least two implications one can glean 
from this interesting result.  
y Clearly, drilling rig companies seem to be at the mercy of the oil firms once 
they had decided to move into a region that is experiencing a huge amount 
of oil extraction.  They cannot control the hiring by adjusting their prices 
(i.e. day-rate), and could be hired and fired as the crude oil price moves up 
and down in the market place. This implication points to the serious strategic 
problems faced by rig owners.  
y Since price (i.e. day-rate) does not influence the demand, the rig owners 
cannot expect to use sophisticated pricing techniques such as revenue 
management in their industry. 
Note that we tried including the oil price and day-rate together in equation 
2-1 (i.e. long-term oriented supply function) directly but did not find any 
significant effect, further vindicating our argument that these two are mainly 
short-term factors.  
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4. A perhaps very interesting finding lies with the estimate of G, the actual 
capacity of the oil field. It comes out to be 609 and highly significant. Recall 
that the capacity is expressed in terms of 3-month contracts, and noting that the 
cumulative number of contracts signed up to 1993 (i.e. end of the data period) 
is 547 we see that the remaining untapped oil in this field amounts to roughly 
is 62 periods. Given that roughly 12 contracts are signed every 3 months, this 
amounts to another 1 to 2 years of 3-month contracts, unless new oil fields are 
discovered nearby39 and a new cycle starts. 
5. Finally note that R-square is 0.93 for the supply side model, which indicates 
that the proposed model captures most of the variance in the number of rigs 
(available and hired) in GOM from the time period Jan 1984 till Dec 1993. All 
the estimates are plausible, significant and with correct signs. These two 
results suggest that the data cannot reject the proposed model. See Figure 2.3 
for the degree of fit obtained between the actual available rig-contracts and 
those predicted by the model (i.e. supply side). In Figure 2.4 we have provided 
the degree of fit between the actual hired rigs and those predicted by the model 
(i.e. demand side). It is clear that the proposed model is able to track the 
demand growth closely.  
 
                                                 
39 As we send the paper for review, we have got the information that this 
particular area did discover a few more oil-reservoirs nearby after 1993. However 
it is important to note that the new discoveries show only the unpredictable nature 
of the world we are trying to model here, and not the oil companies’ wisdom or 
the applicability of the proposed model.  
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IV-ii. Data Set 2 (Jack-up Rigs): 
The second and third data sets pertain to the “250-feet jack-up” rigs 
operating in the GOM region from Jan 1984 till Mar 1993 and those operating 
from Apr 93 till Dec 04 respectively. As mentioned earlier, jack-up rigs constitute 
a major part of the drilling activities, and they operate near the shore, unlike the 
semi-submersibles that operate in deep seas.  The full data set exhibits actually a 
pattern having two cycles (see Figure 2.5), perhaps because in the early 90s the 
Gulf-war broke out and the whole oil & gas industry went through a discrete 
discontinuity. We hence decided to split the data set into two cycles and estimate 
them separately.  
Figure 2.5 Number of GOM Jack-Up Rigs (0-250') 
 
The estimation results of cycle 1 (1984-1992) are provided in the Tables 2.2 
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rigs reported in Table 2.1, the interpretation of the results is also very similar to 
what we provided for Data Set 1 except for one difference. In the supply model 
estimation (column 2 of Table 2.2), the initial capacity estimate (i.e. M(0)) of G 
was also estimated along with other parameters and it turned out to be significant. 
However, p, the parameter that represents the constant updating (i.e. the part not 
influenced by cumulative oil output) turned out to be insignificant. This implies 
that M(0) and p tend to represent similar process in the updating process.  
Table 2.2 Jack-Up Rigs: Cycle 1(1984-1992) 
Supply side model 
 [Equations 2-1 & 2-3] 
Demand side model  
[Equations 2-5] 
Parameters Estimate Parameters Estimates
p Insignificant β0 -1.6643
M(0) (1-0.49)=0.51 G β1 (UR(t-1)) 3.1109
q 2.3396 β2 (oil-price) 0.0004 
(sig at 10% level)
G 3192 β3 (day-rate) -0.0444 
(insignificant)




R-square 0.9537 R-square 0.7329
All estimates are significant at 1% level except when mentioned otherwise.  
IV-iii. Data Set 3 (Jack-up Rigs):  
We now take the cycle-2 of the Jack-Up rigs hiring pattern in GOM for the 
period 1993-2004. The results are provided in the Tables 2.3. They are very 
similar to the results we had with cycle-1 except that the oil price was found to be 
insignificant (i.e. β2 in column 4 in Table 2.3 is insignificant while it is significant 
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in the 4th columns of Table 2.1 and 2.2). This implies that in cycle 2 (i.e. the post 
gulf-war decade) the oil price did not seem to have any impact on the utilization 
rate. The reason, as we understand from talking to the industry experts, is that in 
the post Gulf-war period, OPEC kept the price of oil within a narrow window 
which resulted in minimum fluctuation in the oil price. In other words, the oil 
firms could not use the oil price as a key factor in deciding on the drilling 
operations. 
Table 2.3 Jack-Up Rigs: Cycle 2 (1993-2004) 
Supply side model 
 [Equations 2-1 & 2-3] 
Demand side model  
[Equations 2-5] 
Parameters Estimate Parameters Estimates
p Insignificant β0 -1.7041
M(0) (1-0.55)=0.45 G β1 (UR(t-1)) 3.4749
q 2.1765 β2 (oil-price) -0.0001 
(insignificant)
G 3365 β3 (day-rate) 0.0189 
(insignificant)




R-square 0.9363 R-square 0.6319
All estimates are significant at 1% level except when mentioned otherwise.  
Another interesting point to note is that the estimates pertaining to cycles 1 
and 2 respectively are very similar to each other (except for the impact of oil 
price), implying that after the break that happened due to Gulf war the drilling 
industry repeated exactly their earlier way of working. 
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IV-iv.  Concluding remarks on empirical findings: 
The empirical analysis of the three data sets shows that the demand model 
proposed by us seems to offer a good explanation of the supply (i.e. availability) 
and utilization of the semi-submersible and jack-up rigs in the oil fields. For all 
the three data sets, the degree of fit is very high, the estimates have correct signs 
and are also highly significant and/or have interesting implications for the industry. 
The key results, namely, the evolving capacity of oil field, the impact of oil price 
on rig hiring and the insignificant impact of day-rate on rig hiring, and the 
significant impact of “experience” factor on capacity updating and well drilling, 
hold good across all of the three data sets. Further, noting that the 
semi-submersibles and the jack-up rigs form roughly 80% of the oil drilling 
industry and that GOM is the most active area for offshore drilling, one can claim 
that the proposed model is able to explain satisfactorily the supply and demand 
pattern of the oil rigs.  
Before we conclude the empirical section, we would like to report a finding 
regarding the day-rate.  
IV-v. Day-Rate: 
Recall that we followed the traditional route of including day-rate as one of 
the independent variables in the demand function but, as reported earlier, we could 
not get significant effect for the day-rate on demand in all the three data sets we 
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tested, which indicated that the demand function was not affected by the hiring 
rate. Next, we ran a time series analysis on the “day-rate vs. utilization rate” and 
found that utilization rate affected the day-rate. Specifically, we found that the 
day-rate was positively and significantly influenced by the lag of the utilization 
rate (see Table 2.4 below).  
Table 2.4 Time-Series Analysis of Utilization Rate and Day-Rate 
1. Time Series Identification   
Utilization  AR(1) 
Day-rate  ARIMA(0,1,1) 
2. Cointegration test  I(1) 
3. Var Model   
























4. Granger Causality test   
  Utilization causes Day-rate  p<0.001 
 Day-rate causes Utilization  p>0.05 
The Granger causality test clearly showed that the utilization rate caused the 
day-rate movements. In other words, the day-rate at a point of time is largely 
determined by the extent of utilization of the rigs in the previous period. For the 
sake of clarity, we show in Figure 2.6 the actual movement of utilization rate and 
that of the day-rate in the GOM region for the period 1984 to 2003, with the 
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Gulf-war break in 1992. The close dependency of the day-rate on the utilization 
rate is strikingly obvious. 
Figure 2.6 Day-rate and Utilization Rate for the Period 1984-2004 
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One can conclude that although the drilling rig market is very competitive 
the drilling companies are able to maintain an equilibrium day-rate level that is 
commensurate with the utilization rate, i.e. increasing it as the demand for rigs 
goes up! Said differently, while the demand is not affected by day-rate, the 
demand certainly influences the day-rate in the following period.  
Let us now see how the proposed model fares compared to other models 
that could be estimated on the three data sets we have analyzed. Note that we 
don’t have a perfect “null” model in the marketing or economics literature that 
could be used here. So, we use the models that address a similar issue of demand 
modeling.  
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V.  Bench-Marking with Diffusion Model 
As explained in detail in Section II, the rig hiring pattern in a new oil field 
can resemble a standard diffusion type framework, with an assumption that 
demand for rigs follows the diffusion theory. The Generalized Bass Model (GBM 
for short) introduced in 1994 by Bass, Krishnan and Jain is a well cited diffusion 
model that not only closely follows the Bass model but incorporates the impact of 
marketing mix variables as well. Hence, we will take the GBM for comparison.  
Since the GBM is by definition a demand model, we will use the Sc(t) as the 
variable of interest. This is the number of contracts signed at time t. The GBM is: 
))],0(/)(ln())0(/)(ln(1][/)()][([)( 2121 DRtDROPtOPMtCStCSMtSc CC ββγγ +++−=
where M is the total number of contracts that would be signed eventually, CSC(t) 
is the cumulative number of contracts signed up to time t, OP(t) is the crude oil 
price at t, and DR(t) is the day-rate at time t. The first term on the right hand side 
refers to the remaining market potential, the second term refers to the word of 
mouth influence in the society and the third term refers to the impact of oil price 
and day-rate on the contracts signed. Since SC(t) is the first derivative of CSC(t), 






































iOPiiX ββ , i = t, t-1. 
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Expression 2-6 is the closed-form solution of GBM.  
Note that, in comparison, our proposed model in the current research is a 
2-stage model. The supply side model works on the premises that the experience 
of the industry determines the amount of oil that could extracted and helps to 
update the capacity of the oil field, while the GBM works on the word of mouth 
premises. The experience factor in our proposed model led to a quadratic function 
in the cumulative number of contracts, while the word of mouth effect in the 
GBM leads to a function that is linear in the cumulative number of contracts. Our 
proposed 2-stage model has in it the capacity updating mechanism, while the 
GBM does not have it but assumes a fixed market size. 
We fitted the GBM model to the three data sets we analyzed with the 
2-stage model proposed in our research, namely, Semi-submersibles, 
Jackup-cycle1 and Jackup-cycle2. The results are provided in Table 2.5.  







ν1 0.0211 0.0210 0.0168 
ν2 0.0756 0.0555 0.0431 
M 785 4463 3433 
β1 (oil-price) 0.2909 0.4728 0.1811 
β2 (day-rate) 0.4504 0.3717 0.3248 
R-square 0.6632   0.6585  0.8050 
All estimates are significant at 1% level 
Let us compare the estimation results of the proposed model (Tables 2.1, 
2.2 and 2.3) with those of the GBM (Table 2.5). The following can be observed. 
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1. In all the three data sets the GBM provides a good fit (R-squares 0.6632, 
0.6585 and 0.8050). This vindicates our assertion that the diffusion models bear a 
close resemblance to our research.  
 2. The oil price coefficient (β1) in Table 2.5 is positive and hence is in line 
with the expectation. However, the day-rate (β2) is positive, which is not what one 
would expect since price cannot be expected to positively affect demand. In the 
2-stage model estimation (Table 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3) this estimate was found to be 
insignificant. 
 3. The poorer R-square of GBM compared to that of the 2-stage model is 
partly due to the absence of capacity updating mechanism. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 
graphically depict the fit of the GBM and our proposed 2-stage model with the 
data.  
 4.  We tested the forecasting efficiency of the proposed model and the GBM 
using out-of-sample method. The last three data points were the hold-out sample. 
Note that we have a two-stage model, one for the supply and the other for the 
demand. The former is smoother than the latter. We used actually two 
bench-marks, namely, GBM and the time series model. Results are produced in 
Tables 2.6 and 2.7. We found that the proposed step-1 supply model fared better 
than the GBM and the auto-regressive time series (AR(1)) model, while with 
respect to the demand model, we found that the forecasting efficiency of the 
proposed model was better than the GBM but worse than the AR(1). Since the 
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proposed model is more theoretically sound, we believe that the proposed model 
is better than AR(1) overall. Further, one can use the two models together so as to 
gain greater advantages in terms of descriptive power and forecasting efficiency. 
 
Table 2.6 Prediction on Supply (SR) 
Month Actual GBM AR1 Proposed Model 
Apr-1992 19 18.5040 20.0755 18.1098 
Jul-1992 17 17.4347 19.1121 17.0222 
Oct-1992 16 16.8521 17.1854 15.8205 
Root Mean Square Error 0.62 1.53 0.52 
 
Table 2.7 Prediction on Demand (SC) 
Month Actual GBM AR1 Proposed Model 
Apr-1992 8 7.6166 9.9222 7.0756 
Jul-1992 9 7.2473 9.9222 7.3110 
Oct-1992 10 7.1343 10.6468 7.6160 
Root Mean Square Error   1.95     1.29   1.77 
 
VI. Conclusions, Contributions and Directions for Future 
Research 
We focused our research on modeling the hiring pattern of B2B-Services in 
a new market. We argued that it is the service providers who plan with a 
long-term strategic perspective on how to make available their assets for hire, 
while the actual day-to-day hiring of their services depends on many short-term 
fluctuations in the downstream market. We took the case of rig-services in the oil 
industry for our specific analysis. We found that the drilling rig companies, 
anticipating and estimating rig hiring, position their rigs in the oil field with a 
long-term strategic view in mind, while the oil companies base their day-to-day 
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hiring decisions on the changing short-term market conditions including 
prevailing crude oil price and current hiring rate. We developed two models, one 
for each process, and tested them with three data sets and found the models to 
provide good fit to all the data sets, in turn suggesting that the proposed models 
are clearly one way of analyzing this supply and hiring pattern of capital assets in 
the B2B-Serivces industry.  
Our main contribution is three fold. First, for the oil & gas industry, our 
model will come to be very useful because we not only use the commonly 
available data but also develop straight-forward modeling techniques to bring 
some new insights in the industry. Further, new markets (i.e. B2B-Service markets) 
are opening up across the world, especially in the huge developing economies 
such as China and India, and hence there is huge scope for the application of the 
proposed model. Secondly, for the marketing literature, we believe that our 
approach is the first one that analyzes the service product in a B2B setting. Our 
two-stage model that enables one to track the supply side dynamics and the 
demand side dynamics within a unified framework is an important contribution to 
the literature, especially to the service literature. Thirdly, the empirical results are 
very insightful and could be used by the industry. The three key results, namely, 
the evolving capacity of oil field, the impact of oil price on rig hiring and the  
insignificant impact of day-rate on rig hiring, and the significant impact of 
“experience” factor on capacity updating and well drilling, hold good across all 
of the three data sets. 
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Noting that our research is just a first step in understanding this booming 
B2B-Serices industry, we recommend the following as directions for further 
improvement. First, although we believe that the rationale behind our model 
would apply to other companies in this industry, it is necessary to understand how 
the unique characteristics of each sector would have impact on the model. 
Secondly, the rig-supply and hiring pattern is only one important aspect of this 
industry. There are other key aspects such as contract length and day-rate. Future 
research should look into how these two key elements of rig hiring process affect 
the rig-supply and hiring patterns. Thirdly, the rig owners invest substantial 
amount of money in building their rigs and it will be worthwhile to see if one can 
apply the proposed model and make some recommendations to the firms. Fourthly, 
one interesting outcome of our research is that the estimation of the proposed 
model was able to throw some light on how the oil industry keeps updating the 
capacity of an oil field. One can do further research in this topic to understand the 
other key factors that affect the capacity estimation. This is a very sensitive issue 
however since an oil-firm’s stock price is partly determined by the ‘oil reserve’ 
they claim to maintain. For example, the recent revelation from Shell has resulted 
in a sharply lowered stock price of Shell40.  This can also be useful for the 
various governments that lease out oil tracts. Finally, one can use optimization 
                                                 
40 We are not however sure if Shell or a country it operates in evaluates the oil 
reserve. For example, Nigeria, which is an OPEC member, might have had some 
influence in the over-estimation of the oil reserve.  
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techniques to find out the optimal number of rigs to maintain to achieve certain 
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